ABSTRACT

The diverse coalition of activists trying to cut the prison population has thus far failed to articulate a coherent moral foundation for criminal justice reform. Since the various constituents of this coalition support reform for different reasons, it may seem savvy to avoid conversation about moral questions. We argue, however, that failing to work toward developing a moral basis for reform puts the coalition at risk of repeating the failures of the sentencing reform movement of the 1970s and 1980s. This initially promising movement culminated in the passage of the widely disliked and deeply flawed United States Sentencing Guidelines. We lay out and analyze the downsides of avoiding moral discourse in criminal justice reform movements and argue for more collaboration and dialogue between moral thinkers and activists.

ESSAY

Sentencing reform seemed straightforward . . . at least politically and ideologically, it appeared to be relatively noncontentious. . . .

That sentencing reform was widely seen as noncontentious in the 1970s seems politically naive in retrospect and therefore probably is not true. A more plausible view is that people recognized that various proponents of change had different policy and political agendas in mind but failed to anticipate how partisan and ideological crime control policy would later become and how starkly different the ramifications of the different agendas.¹

¹ Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 5 & n.4 (2006).
Too many people in America are in prison. In recognition of this fact, a broad coalition has come together to pursue change. Many who support criminal justice reform rightly greet this convergence as a hopeful, welcome sign. To avoid squandering this opportunity, however, reformers must focus on more than just finding the easiest way to reduce the number of people in prison. The next, crucial step to move criminal justice reform forward is to develop a moral framework to explain why lowering the number of people in prison is an ethical necessity.

In politics, it is tempting to ignore what seem like intractable disagreements about justice and morality. Many aim to marshal support for particular policy goals, regardless of why their supporters back the chosen policy. This approach seems pragmatic and savvy, but without some moral agreement on why change is necessary, social movements can go awry and fail to achieve progress toward justice. Contemporary movements for reform must articulate a moral vision to explain and guide their work—they must not repeat the mistakes of the past.

The failures of the initial United States Sentencing Commission’s Sentencing Guidelines illustrate these threats. In the 1970s and 1980s, a coalition formed around the idea of reducing sentencing disparities and promoting greater fairness in sentencing. To achieve these goals, the newly formed Commission was tasked with articulating a theory of the purposes of punishment and initiating empirical studies on how to best fulfill those purposes.

The initial Commission abdicated its duty to address the moral and empirical debates surrounding criminal sentencing. It judged that it was too difficult to

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2. See, e.g., William Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice 1 (2011) (“[T]he last half of the twentieth century saw America’s criminal justice system unravel. . . . The nation’s record-shattering prison population has grown out of control. Still more so the African American portion of that prison population . . . .”).


4. For a classic defense of the need for normative discourse in politics—not just strategic compromise, see John Rawls, Political Liberalism 133–72 (expanded ed. 2005).


7. See Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, Dissenting View of
decide if punishment should be understood as seeking retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, or something else.\(^8\)

Instead, it based the Guidelines primarily on average past sentences.\(^9\) To offer a very simplified illustration: given five drug trafficking cases where the traffickers had received, respectively, sentences of one year, two years, three years, and twenty years,\(^10\) the Guidelines sentence for drug trafficking would have been just over five-and-a-half-years. This method settled on what seemed like conveniently available and politically acceptable numbers for criminal sentences.\(^11\) It also removed ethical reasoning from the justification of sentences.\(^12\) The Commission relied upon past practices to generate Guidelines without explaining why those practices constituted something good, right, or just.\(^13\) This approach turned a reform aimed at achieving justice into “the most controversial and disliked sentencing reform initiative in [the twentieth] century.”\(^14\) Basing the Guidelines on past practice—which allowed the initial Commission to avoid moral discourse for the sake of political expedience—was problematic for two main reasons.\(^15\)

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8. See Breyer, supra note 5, at 16–17 (explaining that the Commission faced competing theories about the purposes of punishment and could not decide between them).

9. See id. at 17 (“Faced, on the one hand, with those who advocated ‘just deserts’ . . . and, on the other hand, with those who advocated ‘deterrence’ . . . the Commission reached an important compromise. It decided to base the Guidelines primarily upon typical, or average, actual past practice.”).

10. The data set the Commission used consisted of general information from 100,000 actual federal criminal cases from the previous two years as well as a smaller subset of those cases—approximately 10,500 federal criminal cases—which contained more specified details of the dispositions. See Breyer, supra note 5, at 7–8 n.50.

11. See id. at 23–24.

12. See id. at 24 (stating “the Guidelines consider only past sentencing practices” in determining different sentences).

13. See id. at 7, 17–18 (noting, however, “the Commission’s ‘past practice’ compromise [did] not reflect an effort simply to reconcile two conflicting philosophical positions. It reflect[ed] a lack of adequate, detailed deterrence data, and it reflect[ed] the irrational results of any effort to apply ‘just deserts’ principles to detailed behavior through a group process.”); see also Robinson, supra note 7, at 3988 (noting that the Guidelines are “not rationally calculated to impose just punishment”).


15. Although not central here, it should also be noted that in calculating past sentencing averages, the Commission did not consider non-incarcерative sentences, only terms of imprisonment. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 21 (1987), available at
First, the Sentencing Guidelines’ lack of an overarching normative grounding is a key cause of their unjust consequences. Commissioner Paul Robinson, who dissented from the promulgation of the Guidelines, emphasized this point in an article he authored in 1987. He used the example of a young addict who sells drugs to support his habit. “One judge may impose a long term of imprisonment in order to send a strong deterrent message to drug sellers. Another judge, following the rehabilitation purpose of sentencing, may impose a very short term of incarceration followed by supervised release and required participation in a community drug treatment program.” Either sentence can be justified according to some moral theory of punishment. The average of these sentences, however, cannot. Robinson explained that by relying on averages, the Guidelines provided sentences that served no rational purpose. The averaged sentence is too short to serve as a deterrent, but will not provide the necessary drug treatment to prevent further offenses. From a moral standpoint, these numbers, based on past judicial practice, are arbitrary. Without normative foundations that prevent such arbitrariness, the Sentencing Guidelines lead to unjust consequences for the accused.

While the Guidelines’ extreme harshness and encroachment on judicial power are also central causes of their perceived illegitimacy, their lack of moral foundations undermines their public credibility further. Reliance on arbitrary numerical averaging means that sentences cannot be convincingly justified to

http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/1987/manual-pdf/1987_Supplementary_Report_Initial_Sentencing_Guidelines.pdf. The decision to include only incarcerative sentences skewed the averages higher. See id. Outliers on the very low end (that is, certain non-incarcerative sentences) were ignored, but outliers on the very high end (very long terms of incarceration for certain crimes) did influence the averages. See id.

17. Id. at 3986–88.
19. Id. at 15.
20. Id.
21. See id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.; see also Dissenting View of Commissioner Paul H. Robinson on the Promulgation of Sentencing Guidelines by the United States Sentencing Commission 4 (May 1, 1987), available at http://eden.rutgers.edu/~hlm/digital_libraries/phr_dissention.pdf (“[B]y adopting no policy . . . the guidelines provide ‘bastardized’ sentences that will serve neither of the two purposes. For the young addict, the ‘averaged’ sentence will be too short to send the strong deterrent message, and will not provide the treatment necessary for rehabilitation.”).
judges, defendants, victims, or the public at large. The public, as well as agents of
the court, are owed a satisfying explanation of our system of punishment. Otherwise,
there is no way to evaluate the system as a whole and its success at
achieving its goals. Absent such explanations, those regulated by this policy will
be rightly dubious about accepting it; they have not been offered the coherent
justification that they are owed as citizens. Criminal justice policies, like any
coercive laws, must be mutually justifiable to count as legitimate.26

In part to respond to the Guidelines’ worst excesses, a movement to reduce
the prison population has emerged.27 #cut50 is a bipartisan initiative seeking to
reduce incarceration by half, and it has attracted leaders from across the political
spectrum: libertarians, religious conservatives, progressives, and beyond.28 This
coalition is representative of all of the promise and delicate risk criminal justice
reform involves. The promise is that this movement may incite real change.29 The
risk is repeating the failures of the sentencing reform movement of the 1970s and
1980s, which culminated in the Guidelines. If difficult questions about justice and
morality are sidestepped, #cut50 risks failing to achieve fundamental reforms, even
if it succeeds in getting legislation passed.

Van Jones, one of the founders of #cut50, will not repeat one of the mistakes
of the initial Sentencing Commission: ignoring empirical research.30 He writes
glowsingly of a social movement based upon “hard science, objective data and
innovative models.”31 Still, while the utility of good social science and
technological innovation for the criminal justice reform movement is beyond

30. See Breyer, supra note 5, at 16–18.
dispute, they—alone—are not sufficient.

Reform cannot be completely data driven. It also requires a moral vision: a picture of justice, equality, and solidarity that justifies the need for reform. Political theorist Brian Barry argues that “[t]he absence of an explicit conception of social justice in political life” means that public policy arguments often “rest on tacit assumptions that would not withstand scrutiny if they were spelt out formally.” Reform cannot be completely data driven. It also requires a moral vision: a picture of justice, equality, and solidarity that justifies the need for reform. Political theorist Brian Barry argues that “[t]he absence of an explicit conception of social justice in political life” means that public policy arguments often “rest on tacit assumptions that would not withstand scrutiny if they were spelt out formally.”

Empirical data can help society see the way to achieving a more fully articulated moral vision, but numbers and data are a means, not an end of social change. Mass incarceration is a moral and political problem as well as a technical one.

#cut50, its bipartisan supporters, and other criminal justice reform activists do allude to morality, of course. Generally, the immorality of current criminal justice policies has been a major talking point among people calling for reform. For instance, the #cut50 website explicitly characterizes overly harsh criminal justice policies as “morally indefensible.” As of yet, however, the moral grounding for this claim of indefensibility is unspecified. The name and goal of #cut50 exemplify this indeterminacy. What precisely makes current policies unjust—and why a 50 percent reduction in particular is needed—requires explanation. Some members of the reform coalition hope to reduce the size of government, others want greater economic efficiency, some aim at racial justice, and other supporters focus on public safety. These varied commitments will recommend different priorities and policies.

32. BRIAN BARRY, WHY SOCIAL JUSTICE MATTERS 10 (2005).
35. Our Mission, supra note 28 (“Reliance on overly long sentences and tough on crime policies is both morally indefensible and economically unjustifiable.”).
36. See id. (specifying the goal of #cut50 as “safely and smartly reduc[ing] our incarcerated population by 50 percent over the next 10 years” but failing to explain the basis for this goal).
38. See Agenda, supra note 37.
Some will see these varied commitments as a reason to avoid discussion of justice and morality as much as possible, and to pursue an exclusively numbers-focused approach. The disagreements within this coalition may appear far too deep to yield a shared vision of how the battle against mass incarceration should proceed.\textsuperscript{39} Instead, some may argue, as Sentencing Commissioners did, that change can be achieved by rallying around particular policy goals.\textsuperscript{40} The goal of cutting the prison population by 50 percent could function as a focal point for pursuing change, even if different parties want to cut the incarceration rate for different reasons.

This strategy is all too recognizable and all too risky. The inference that disagreement over morality and the need for compromise means that politics can ignore moral purposes is completely mistaken.\textsuperscript{41} Making this inference threatens to reproduce some of the pitfalls of past efforts at sentencing reform. While current movements will not likely reproduce earlier sentencing reform efforts’ disastrous results, a hazy moral vision will hamper the effectiveness of contemporary movements for criminal justice reform. Moral foundations are crucial in determining the best means for achieving the movement’s goals, identifying important reforms beyond reducing the number of people in prison, and justifying the need for change publicly.

If reformers do not know why America should cut its prison population by precisely 50 percent (or some other chosen percentage), then they will know how best to approach this challenge. People who agree generally that the prison population should be reduced may have very different views about the appropriate sentences for sex offenses, domestic violence, property crimes, and high-level drug trafficking offenses, for example.\textsuperscript{42} Their views on when, why, and what sort of punishment is called for will differ, depending on what they see as the point of punishment.\textsuperscript{43} Absent a moral framework to guide particular policy choices, a risk of keeping people in prison who should not be there and perhaps letting others out who should remain incarcerated exists.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{40} See Breyer, supra note 5, at 7 (noting the Commission was determined to achieve the policy goal of promulgating sentencing guidelines).
\item \textsuperscript{42} See, e.g., Leon Neyfakh, \textit{OK, So Who Gets to Go Free?}, SLATE (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2015/03/prison_reform_releasing_only_nonviolent_offenders_won_t_get_you_very_far.html.
\item \textsuperscript{43} See id.
\end{itemize}
Without a moral vision, there is also a risk of ignoring problems with mass incarceration that reach beyond the sheer number of people in prison. The American criminal justice system involves a complicated web of practices and institutions, many of which contribute to current social problems and injustices.\textsuperscript{44} Indigent probationers face exorbitant fines and fees, which place them in debt and, if unpaid, can lead to incarceration.\textsuperscript{45} To save money, prisons cut educational, vocational, and treatment programs that can help prisoners rebuild their lives after prison.\textsuperscript{46} Crushing caseloads overload criminal justice institutions and lead to wrongful convictions.\textsuperscript{47} And many juvenile detention facilities, which house a particularly vulnerable population, have abhorrent conditions.\textsuperscript{48} Taking these issues into account in policy proposals demands adopting a perspective that goes beyond critiquing the number of prisoners. A full critique means providing a normative analysis of mass incarceration in all of its complexity.

Beyond providing a way to evaluate whether policy proposals are achieving their goals, a moral vision is important for justifying the need to end mass incarceration to a potentially wary public that is accustomed to the status quo. #cut50 rightly informs people of the staggering statistic that the U.S. locks up 25 percent of the world’s prisoners despite having just 5 percent of the world’s population.\textsuperscript{49}


\textsuperscript{45} See, e.g., Sarah Stillman, \textit{Get Out of Jail, Inc.}, \textsc{The New Yorker} (Jun. 23, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/23/get-out-of-jail-inc (explaining that many jurisdictions have turned to private companies to supervise probationers and that these companies charge high fees that, if unpaid, subject probationers to incarceration).


population.\textsuperscript{49} This vast differential makes our carceral practices seem less normal. But these practices are not just abnormal; they are unjust. Beyond economic wastefulness, current practices can be accused of perpetuating racial and economic inequality and wasting human potential.\textsuperscript{50} To motivate change, activists must offer the public a narrative that can garner support for a long-term project of reform and change, not just a short-term—albeit hugely significant—legislative effort. Given the kinds of challenges facing calls for reform, activists need to change the public’s mindset about imprisonment in fundamental respects.

This argument implies a need for dialogue between criminal justice reform activists and moral thinkers from throughout civil society and academia. The pursuit of social change is not reducible to strategic questions about politics, policy, and law. It also requires sustained reflection on what may initially seem like abstruse questions about what the point of a criminal justice system is in the first place. This dialogue will not be one that arrives at easy, simple conclusions, but an ongoing attempt to work toward consensus on difficult and subtle social questions.\textsuperscript{51} This process of learning and contestation must exist alongside efforts to build political power and influence policy through pressure, bargaining, and negotiation. Activists must not neglect the need for hardheaded political maneuvering and empirically informed policy-making, but they cannot lose sight of their moral aims, either. Historical examples of engagement between reformers and theorists demonstrate the fruits that such mutual exchanges can bear: civil rights activists engaged with theorists of non-violence\textsuperscript{52} and progressive education reformers developed a dialogue with philosopher John Dewey.\textsuperscript{53} In both cases, engagement enriched the movement and helped it meet its goals. To succeed, moral thinkers must develop work that is useful to reformers, and activists must be willing to engage with and contest the work of theorists. Some individuals may even embody both roles, bridging the gap between theory and practice in much the

\textsuperscript{49} See Our Mission, supra note 28.
\textsuperscript{50} See, e.g., Katayson Majd, Students of the Mass Incarceration Nation, 54 How. L.J. 343, 352–54 (2011) (“People of color disproportionately and overwhelming experience the devastating impacts of [increasing incarceration rates].”).
\textsuperscript{52} See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Donald Weise, The Civil Rights Identity of Bayard Rustin, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 1133 (2004) (discussing Bayard Rustin’s contributions to the integration of nonviolence theory into the civil rights movement).
same way that James Lawson54 and Jane Addams55 did in their work. An approach that integrates moral and strategic perspectives keeps social movements focused on their goals, but avoids drifting off into unhelpful abstractions.

#cut50’s aims are laudable and the broad support their bipartisan efforts have garnered is an encouraging, admirable achievement. Indeed, members of this growing coalition are ideally positioned to foster discussion of the moral vision behind ending mass incarceration. Articulating this vision to guide the pursuit of social change is the next, crucial step in this movement. While data and legislative success are crucial, and compromise is necessary, this movement cannot fail to take up the task of developing a vision of why fighting mass incarceration matters. Justice depends on it.


55. For more information on the achievements of Jane Addams see JANE ADDAMS, TWENTY YEARS AT HULL-HOUSE (ann. ed., Univ. of Ill. Press 1990) (1910).